Professor Dales has established himself in recent years as the uncompromising -if not always discriminating -scourge of economists who are careless enough to communicate with the public in looser language than they would use in teaching their students or writing for their colleagues. While the touch of his lash is intentionally painful, it is undoubtedly salutary, both for the careless author and for his readers, in calling attention to underlying assumptions that the economist regards as reasonable but which may therefore not be spelled out sufficiently for his audience. Let me use the occasion of his wrath to explain some of these assumptions, by commenting on his major points of criticism.
( 1) I must apologize to Professor Dales for my failure to present his argument faithfully to the readers of the Journal. They now have it from Professor Dales' own mouth: the lower-case national policy-the trinity of railways, immigration, and protection -was a dismal failure as a nation-builder, but the upper-case National Policy -the tariff itself -was effective in leading to high-cost manufacturing activity in Canada. I am Professor Dales' grateful student on the first point, and all respectable Canadian economists now seem agreed on the second. But the tariff has always been justified on grounds of its contribution to the first objective, the second result being regarded as a price of the policy and not its major objective. The major issue between us, therefore, is whether removal of the tariff, and specifically its partial removal in the particular form of a Canadian-American free trade arrangement, would tend to increase or decrease the size of the Canadian manufacturing sector; this is an issue to which I shall return.
( 2) Typographical booby-traps aside, I would not attempt to maintain that my article was the finest piece of prose I have ever written; but it 36 did express my thoughts, for better or worse, and if Professor Dales considers it tendentious, badly written, and -recognizable as mine only by a view of Canadian political history -not my own original work, incidentally, but an insight gained from the Canadian historian Professor Wise of Queen's University-which he strongly disagrees with, that is his privilege but not my shame.
( 3) The term "Canadian-American economic integration" is admittedly tendentious, in that in principle any free-trade arrangement among a few countries has both a free trade aspectthe elimination of internal trade barriers -and a protectionist aspect -the increased discrimination against outsiders implicit in the maintenance of tariffs against them by the members while trade barriers are eliminated internally. This much international trade theorists were taught many years ago by the great North American economist Jacob Viner, and do not need reminding of by Professor Dales. However, Viner's analysis also indicated that the effects of such an arrangement on world economic efficiency -the objective of all free-traders like myself and Professor Dales -depend on the balance between trade-creating and trade-diverting effects that it achieves, trade-creation being the substitution of lower-cost partner for highercost domestic production, and trade-diversion being the substitution of higher-cost member for lower-cost non-member production. Most Canadian economists now seem agreed -and I was implicitly assuming it to be the case -that a Canadian-American free trade arrangement would be on balance trade-creating and beneficial to Canada in particular but also to the United States. The reasoning underlying this assumption about the facts is as follows: (a) Canada already discriminates against the United States, and in favour of a large proportion of her other suppliers, through the Commonwealth Preference system; hence part of the effect of Canadian-American free trade would be a reversal and not an intensification of distortions from the effects of a universal free trade policy; ( b) since Canadian-American trade constitutes the bulk of Canadian trade in both directions, and since a large fraction of the goods Canada now exports to the United States are also exported elsewhere and hence may be considered internationally competitive, it is highly probable that most of the effects of a Canadian-American free trade arrangement would be trade-creating and not trade-diverting.
Aside from this judgment of the probable economic consequences of Canadian-American free trade, one has to recognize that in the modern world governments are basically protectionist, and that the systems by which free trade may be approached is one of negotiation between protectionist countries. In particular, governments will not be persuaded by the logic of free trade, which points to unilateral adoption of free trade regardless of other countries' policies, but want to be able to offer their protectionist constituents a quid pro quo in the shape of enlarged access to foreign markets in exchange for the loss of protected positions in the domestic market. In addition, there is the consideration that in a world of nations willing to resort to increased protectionism for both protectionist and balanceof-payments reasons, a country that committed itself unilaterally to free trade would have no means of preventing other nations from solving their own problems by protectionist means at the expense of disturbance to the free-trade country's domestic economy; and while this risk might well be tolerable to a free trader, it is unlikely to be assumed willingly by governments. In consequence, the practical choice facing free traders in the modern world is between arguing for the pursuit of freer trade by negotiation for reciprocal non-discriminatory tariff reductions, and arguing for the pursuit of freer trade through free trade arrangements or customs unions among like-minded countries, both of which paradoxically are legitimate according to the rules of the relevant international institution, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. If there were any substantial prospect of establishing world free trade along the former line of action, I would much prefer it, as I suppose would Professor Dales; but the glacial progress of the Kennedy Round has persuaded meand many others -that this route to freer trade
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is blocked by the intransigence of the European Economic Community, and that the only avenue open to Canada in the near future is to negotiate free trade with the United States, far from the ideal of world free trade as such an arrangement would be. This view rests on the factual judgment already referred to, that on balance free trade with the United States would move Canada towards the free trade position. It is also supported by the notion that a Canadian-American free trade arrangement might provide a more effective basis for bargaining for non-discriminatory reciprocal reduction of tariffs among the major countries of the world.
( 4) Contrary to Professor Dales' opinion, I was not trying to panic the public into a quick decision. I was pointing out, instead, though probably in insufficient detail, that the historical conjuncture implies that a decision, whether conscious or unconscious, will have to have been made before very long. The Kennedy Round is approaching its end, and the negotiating authority of the Trade Expansion Act expires on June 30, 1967; meanwhile, the European Economic Community is coming into effect according to its time-table. If Canadian and American policy simply stand still thereafter, and particularly if Britain succeeds in its new endeavour to enter the EEC, the result of the increasing discrimination against North America by Europe will be a further regionalization of North American trade, whether we like it or not. The question, then, is whether we simply accept this result, or foster it in ways that will increase rather than reduce the efficiency of resource allocation on the North American continent.
( 5) The first passage Professor Dales cites in support of his claim that I have been needlessly pressing the panic button is, I realize, grammatically ambiguous, and I apologize to the reader for it. But the facts seem to me to speak for themselves, regardless of what they may be interpreted to imply about insults to national pride: Canada's desire for American capital has led the Canadian Government to enter into arrangements to prevent the inflow of this capital from worsening the U.S. balance of payments, arrangements which accept the idea that the United States will discriminate in favour of Canada in its balance-of-payments policy provided that Canada discriminates against Europe. The balance-of-payments implications for the U.S. of intensified conflict in Viet Nam and domestic boom have been accentuating the pressure on Canada to accept and live by the notion that Canada's economic interests require the sacrifice of autonomy in relations with the rest of the world in exchange for privileges in the American capital market. Professor Dales' statements on this point are inconsistent with the facts: first, no matter how rich a country is, if it insists on maintaining an overvalued currency it becomes weak and dependent on the good will of countries with money to lend -American policy since 1957 bears ample witness to this fact; second, Canada has bowed to American threatsotherwise, why did Canada trade an agreement to restrict the magnitude of Canadian reserves in exchange for exemption from the Interest Equalization Tax; third, Canada has agreed as part of these arrangements to prevent the passthrough of American capital to Europe, which amounts to hurting Europeans because they have a favourable balance of payments with the United States. (Incidentally, in this connection Professor Dales confuses matters unnecessarily by identifying the favourable overall balance of payments of Europe with the United States, which involves a drain of international reserves from the U.S. to Europe, with the favourable current-account balance which many Canadians seem to desire, but the absence of which is quite consistent with a reserve drain from the U.S. to Canada if capital inflows are more than sufficient to finance a Canadian current-account deficit.) ( 6) The question of the long-run effect of free trade with the United States on Canada -the second item in Professor Dales' "bill of particulars" -is crucial. Professor Dales assumes that the present inefficiency of Canadian manufacturing is immutable, and logically concludes that free trade must either eliminate the manufacturing or force Canadian workers to offset its effects by accepting lower wages than they now enjoy. However, as a mounting volume of economic research -to some of which my article SS referred -has demonstrated, the inefficiency in question is not immutable but is itself the consequence of protection in a small domestic market, which makes it optimal for Canadian manufacturing to use older-fashioned technology and to sacrifice economies of scale for the marketing advantages of product variety. In the large market that free trade with the United States would provide, Canadian manufacturers could employ the most up-to-date technology and specialize so as to exploit economies of scale. If they could do so, the lower Canadian wage rate would be a competitive advantage, and free trade would either raise the wage rate or expand the Canadian manufacturing population, whereas at present the lower wage rate is necessary to offset the competitive disadvantage of inefficiency promoted by the tariff.
(7) My passage on the French-Canadians was, I should have thought, so obviously an afterthought as not to require placarding by Professor Dales. In general, I believe as an economist that economic improvement frees people to exercise their preferences more fully and so fulfil themselves, and that a rising stand- le numero $1.50 abonnement: 1 an $5.00 • 2 ans $9.00 · etudiant: 1 an $4.00
